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While the development of intelligent technologies in security surveillance can augment human 
capabilities, they do not replace the role of the operator entirely; as such, when developing 
surveillance support it is critical that limitations to the cognitive system are taken into account. 
The current article reviews the cognitive challenges associated with the task of a CCTV operator: 
visual search and cognitive/perceptual overload, attentional failures, vulnerability to distraction, 
and decision-making in a dynamically evolving environment. While not directly applied to 
surveillance issues, we suggest that the NSEEV (noticing – salience, effort, expectancy, value) 
model of attention could provide a useful theoretical basis for understanding the challenges faced 
in detection and monitoring tasks. Having identified cognitive limitations of the human operator, 
this review sets out a research agenda for further understanding the cognitive functioning related 
to surveillance, and highlights the need to consider the human element at the design stage when 
developing technological solutions to security surveillance.  
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General Audience Summary 
High expectations are placed upon surveillance technologies to protect infrastructure and public 
places. While technological systems can automate some aspects of the surveillance process, the 
human operator is still ultimately responsible for detection of suspicious activities and decision-
making. Thus, the optimal design and development of new technology should not focus solely on 
the capabilities of the system itself, but on supporting the operator’s cognitive vulnerabilities. 
Observations and interviews with closed-circuit television personnel have previously highlighted 
several challenges with the task and control room environment – including information overload, 
distraction, and long work shifts – which we review in terms of the cognitive science literature. 
We set out a research agenda to investigate these issues in relation to a recent psychological 
theory of detection, and suggest ways in which progress can be made regarding training of 
operators, visualization and workspace design, and the use of intelligent and automated systems.   
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See no evil: Cognitive challenges of security surveillance and monitoring 
What Is Surveillance?  
Surveillance can take many forms, such as monitoring of crowds (e.g., riots, 
lifeguarding), a particular individual (shoplifter, terrorism suspect, drug dealer), objects 
(vehicles, unattended baggage), infrastructure (both public and remote; e.g., government 
buildings, railways, hydroelectric dams), or computer systems (cyber-attacks), as well as radar-
based monitoring and risk assessment such as that required by air traffic controllers or military 
personnel. These supervisory monitoring tasks are all similar in that they involve concentration 
for long periods on a complex and dynamically evolving situation, whereby particular rules are 
kept in mind to identify visual threats in the environment. Given the potential high cost of a 
detection failure (e.g., bomb explosion, drowning, mid-air collision, cyber-attack), high 
expectations are placed upon surveillance personnel to ensure safety and security. As such, a 
burgeoning area of research in a number of surveillance domains is the development of 
intelligent technologies to automate aspects of the detection process and augment the capabilities 
of the human operator. Nevertheless, the human operator retains a critical role in the process of 
detection and decision-making and thus it is imperative that any developments in surveillance 
technology take into account the limitations of the human cognitive system. Effective 
surveillance support must consider the cognitive fit between three elements: the task, the 
technological system, and the human operator. Yet, efforts so far to develop human factors 
guidelines for surveillance system design have mainly focused on technology- and task-related 
issues (see, e.g., de Bruijn, Jansen, Lenior, Pikaar, & Schreibers, 2016; Pikaar, Lenior, 
Schreibers, & de Bruijn, 2015; but see Stainer, Scott-Brown, & Tatler, 2017), thereby leaving the 
influence of human cognition underestimated. Towards filling this gap, the current article 
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reviews the cognitive challenges faced by the human operator in relation to supervisory 
monitoring tasks – with particular focus on urban security surveillance – and evaluates ways in 
which these processes could be augmented through technology and training. 
Surveillance Technologies 
Surveillance technologies are essential to protecting a country’s critical infrastructure and 
public places (e.g., city centres, airports, metro, major sport/entertainment events, information 
technology facilities) against the threat of terrorism, civil unrest, criminal activity, and cyber-
attacks. Urban security surveillance relies heavily on closed-circuit television (CCTV) for two 
purposes: First, it is a means to monitor evolving activity in real-time with the possibility for 
intervention. During the 2011 London riots for example, CCTV facilitated the monitoring of 
evolving situations in multiple locations in real-time, allowing for higher order organization, 
prioritization, and the deployment of officers to specific sites. Increased security surveillance is 
also required for any high-profile events that draw large crowds (e.g., royal family, sports events, 
political rallies), in the hope that any potential threats might be detected and eliminated before an 
incident occurs. In these cases it is important to take advantage of human perception and 
intuition for the early identification of behaviours that might lead to adverse events (Brunyé, 
Howe, & Mahoney, 2014; Kaplan, Mintz, & Mishal, 2006). A second purpose is to provide an 
important visual record of a public space at any given time, so that it may be viewed 
retrospectively to detect the presence of a particular person/object in a particular place, or to 
trace the onset/development of an event that has already occurred. For example, one Scotland 
Yard review found that CCTV footage was used in 86 of 90 murder cases over a one-year period, 
and was key to solving 65 of these (Foy, 2010). A number of major incidents have also relied 
heavily upon retrospective CCTV footage to identify suspect persons/vehicles and to help piece 
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together the time course of events (e.g., the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the 2015 Paris 
attacks).  
With the increasing coverage of surveillance cameras, there is a greater workload placed 
upon control centre operators to adequately monitor and detect incidents from the wealth of 
footage available. By 2011, the UK’s Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) estimated 
that there were 1.85 million cameras in the UK, with the government having invested £500 
million in such equipment over the preceding decade. In order to ease the burden on the human 
operator, a burgeoning area of research is the development of intelligent video surveillance 
systems that aim to automatically identify/interpret the visual scene. This may take the form of 
alerts to direct the operator in a timely manner towards suspicious objects/behaviour that might 
require further attention and/or intervention; and can also be used in retrospective investigations 
to filter through hours of footage and pinpoint critical events, suspects, or locations. For 
example, background/foreground subtraction or temporal differencing techniques can be used to 
detect particular objects or changes in a visual scene (Valera & Velastin, 2005), and filtering 
mechanisms are used to track and predict movement (e.g., Nguyen, Venkatesh, West, & Bui, 
2003).  
Despite such advances, intelligent multi-camera surveillance faces many challenges. In 
terms of inter-camera tracking, it can be difficult to match the appearance of objects across 
different camera feeds due to differences in illumination, viewpoints, and camera settings 
(Wang, 2013). In some cases – for example, if a tracked suspect discards his/her black sweatshirt 
to then reveal a white t-shirt underneath – a human operator may prove superior to a computer 
algorithm in determining constancy in the face of a change in appearance. Tracking performance 
tends to be reduced markedly when people are wearing similar colours (Krumm et al., 2000) as 
Challenges of security surveillance 7 
 
image algorithms are often not robust enough to cope with more fine-grained differences of 
appearance. Furthermore, given that areas in need of high security such as airports and stations 
are also highly populated, occlusion is a major problem for tracking algorithms. Intelligent 
systems can alert and advise the operator but are still subject to misses and false positives. Even 
when visual changes are correctly identified, a judgement needs to be made regarding how 
important such a change is. For the time-being certainly, intelligent systems cannot replace the 
critical role of the human to oversee, evaluate, and prioritize software-generated options 
(Dadashi, Stedmon, & Pridmore, 2013); rather such systems may be used to help augment the 
human’s capabilities (e.g., Atrey, El Saddik, & Kankanhalli, 2011; Parasuraman & Galster, 
2013). Advancement in this area will not necessarily be achieved just by introducing intelligent 
systems within the operators’ current role, but rather by assessing – during the design process – 
how automation and the human can operate as coagents (Suss, Vachon, Lafond, & Tremblay, 
2015). In so doing, it is therefore important to fully analyse the task environment and cognitive 
limitations of the CCTV operator in order to suggest the nature of support tools and design 
features that might best fit with the human agent. 
The Task of a CCTV Operator 
CCTV operations involve both “reactive” and “proactive” surveillance (Keval & Sasse, 
2010), each of which employ slightly different cognitive processes. Reactive surveillance 
(response to a specific incident, either retrospectively or in real time) is mostly driven by top-
down guidance whereby the operator must identify, amongst other potential distractors, 
particular individual(s), groups, vehicles, etc., from a given description and then track their 
movement. For example, operators may be asked to identify and track a potential shoplifter who 
has left the premises; or may need to be alert to a missing person who is believed to have 
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travelled to that particular city. Proactive surveillance (anticipation of an incident) is a search for 
suspicious activity based on given rules or subjective heuristics, involving vigilance over time so 
that critical behaviours or events are not missed (e.g., it might be necessary to monitor for 
potential trespassers in a prohibited area, or for indications of unrest in a night-time city centre). 
This likely involves a combination of attentional processes; for example, top-down control may 
play a role in bottom-up search after attention has been captured by a salient element (see, e.g., 
Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000). Furthermore, it is possible that in the absence of a specific 
search target, proactive surveillance may be driven by multiple top-down search templates of 
potential target events (e.g., pickpocketing, an escalating altercation, or loitering; Howard, 
Gilchrist, Troscianko, Behera, & Hogg, 2011), thus proactive search is unlikely to be purely 
stimulus-driven but guided by expectation also.   
The frequency of events occurring during proactive surveillance can vary greatly: On the 
one hand, the frequency of incidents may be very low (e.g., monitoring a store at night), and on 
the other hand, the frequency can be overwhelmingly high (e.g., riots). Unlike reactive 
surveillance, which has a well-defined goal, proactive surveillance is an ongoing search for items 
or events that may not necessarily occur. Furthermore, events may occur that fall outside of a 
pre-established search set, but which may nevertheless pose an unexpected threat. Thus decision-
making is a key feature of the task; that is, not only “seeing” an incident, but interpreting its 
significance and determining an appropriate level of response. This continuous visual search for 
low-probability potential incidents shares some similarities with other surveillance tasks such as 
baggage screening or air traffic control, although there are also notable differences: Unlike the 
static screen shots used in luggage monitoring (see Biggs & Mitroff, 2015), urban security 
surveillance involves dynamic, evolving crowd scenes which place greater demands on visual 
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search processes; and unlike for example, an air traffic controller who observes and actively 
manipulates aircraft within a flight space (e.g., Metzger & Parasuraman, 2001), the job of a 
CCTV operator is passive with no interaction or influence over the movement of targets.  
Cognitive Challenges for the Human Operator 
A heavy reliance is placed upon CCTV operators to detect potential incidents and 
maintain public safety and security, but studies show that effectiveness is less than optimal (e.g., 
Gill et al., 2005; Webster, 2009). Some of the factors impacting CCTV effectiveness are 
equipment-related, such as the positioning of the camera (field of view, obstructions), its 
manoeuvrability (presence of pan, tilt and zoom functions), and the quality of the video footage 
(lighting, frames per second). Yet many issues represent cognitive challenges faced by the 
human user, and must equally be addressed to ensure the high level of effectiveness that we 
assume of our surveillance networks (van Voorthuijsen et al., 2005). Previous studies conducted 
within surveillance control rooms have raised a number of human factors issues. In particular, we 
consider the studies of Keval & Sasse (2010), who conducted 4-6 hour observations and 
interviews with operators and managers across 13 control rooms; Gill et al. (2005) who also used 
observation and semi-structured interviews across 13 control rooms; and Smith (2004) who 
conducted observations and informal interviews with CCTV operators based on a UK college 
campus. Here we review the issues raised in these studies in relation to cognitive theory and 
experimental psychological literature, before setting out a research agenda and considering 
possible solutions that might address the current barriers to effectiveness. 
One key obstacle in effective CCTV monitoring is the sheer volume of information for 
which operators are responsible. A major problem in many control rooms is the high camera-to-
person ratio (e.g., Gill et al., 2005) with sometimes up to 50 screens to be monitored at once 
Challenges of security surveillance 10 
 
(Troscianko et al., 2004). Operators report feeling overwhelmed by the sheer amount of 
information that must be attended and processed (Keval & Sasse, 2010). This is supported by 
experimental studies of divided visual attention, whereby the visual system becomes noticeably 
stretched and performance declines when monitoring four scenes concurrently (Rousselet, 
Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004; van Voorthujsen et al., 2005). Moreover, the number of potential 
camera feeds to select from often greatly exceeds the number of available screens on which to 
view them (e.g., a single operator may be responsible for up to 175 cameras at one time; Gill et 
al., 2005). Given that switch costs are well-documented in basic cognitive research (e.g., 
Monsell, 2003), the act of switching itself may introduce inefficiencies in monitoring. When 
constantly shifting attention between multiple camera views, situation awareness (SA) – that is, 
the ability of an operator to perceive the elements and events of his or her work environment 
with respect to time or space, to understand their meaning in relation to the tasks at play, and to 
foresee how they may change over time – will be reduced each time until the operator has 
reassessed the new scene and updated their situational model (Endsley, 1995; see also Bedny, 
Karwowski, & Jeng, 2004). 
Given the impossibility of monitoring all screens and camera feeds concurrently, the 
operator must make decisions on which areas and individuals to fixate, and often these are based 
on heuristics, recent experience, and personal biases (Smith, 2004). For example, it might be 
prudent to devote more attention to a camera positioned on a parking lot if car crime has been a 
particular concern. The movement patterns of individuals may render them more likely targets 
for surveillance if they are moving too quickly, not moving (i.e., loitering), or appearing to have 
no particular direction (Smith, 2004). Also, eye-movement patterns may be deemed suspicious if 
a person is either looking around a lot, or staring at someone or something in particular for an 
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extended period (Stedmon, Harris, Carse, Sharples, & Wilson, 2008). Operator personal 
prejudice is also apparent in the frequent targeting of young males (Norris & Armstrong, 1997), 
particularly those wearing hooded sweatshirts, baseball caps, or puffer jackets, who may be 
deemed as having subcultural, criminal affiliations (Smith, 2004). This heuristic processing can 
potentially introduce error (e.g., fixating for a long time on a youth wearing a hooded sweatshirt, 
at the risk of missing a potentially more serious incident on another screen). Attention is 
important for understanding the intent and action aspects of threat detection, but this can be more 
greatly influenced by top down factors the more demanding the situation (Parasuraman & 
Galster, 2013). As such, cognitive overload can give rise to more heuristic processing and 
personal biases may become more apparent. Stainer et al. (2013) showed that trained CCTV 
operators tend to spend more time monitoring a single camera feed of their choice on an isolated 
screen than a multiple-scene display. Such findings suggest that experts in CCTV surveillance 
may favour the use of a search strategy based on their prediction of where crime is likely to 
occur in order to reduce the demands of multiple-screen monitoring. 
A recent study by Stainer et al. (2017) revealed that detection performance on a multiple-
scene display is not exclusively driven by the number of scenes in the display. The authors 
showed that more visual information was associated with poorer detection performance 
regardless of whether this information was presented in a single scene or across multiple scenes. 
They also observed that the detection of relevant targets was improved compared to the detection 
of less important targets, with the magnitude of the difference increasing with the number of 
scenes to monitor. Such findings suggest that the amount of information available and its level of 
importance in relation to the surveillance task are in fact the key factors determining detection 
performance in multiple-screen surveillance, rather than the mere number of feeds to monitor. 
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 Another difficulty noted in interviews/observational studies of proactive surveillance is 
that in many cases there is a fair amount of uncertainty regarding the specific nature of to-be-
detected critical events, which is why personal biases come into play (Gill et al., 2005; Smith, 
2004). Although in some work environments (e.g., airports) specific guidance is provided 
regarding the identification of suspicious items or unusual behavioural patterns, in other cases 
operators are simply told to “do surveillance” or to “look out for incidents” (Donald, 1998), 
meaning that the operator must make decisions about potential criminal activity based upon quite 
ill-defined and subjective criteria. Many operators report just having a “sixth sense” for when an 
incident may occur (Keval & Sasse, 2010), a concept that may be linked to intuition or intuitive 
decision-making. As opposed to analytical decision making, intuitive decision making relies 
upon a holistic approach to processing information and places more importance on feelings than 
facts and details (Sauter, 1999; see also Bryant, 2007). According to contemporary cognitive 
scientists, intuition is viewed as a cognitive state that is the end product of an implicit learning 
experience (e.g., Reber, 1989): Through experience, operators acquire expertise by implicitly 
internalizing certain activities and making them automatic. This enables the development of an 
overview approach to problem solving that guides information gathering and helps linking 
information in nonobvious ways. In the context of surveillance, intuition can help, for instance, 
identifying events that seem unrelated but, in reality, have a meaningful relationship. While this 
ability may develop with experience, it is hardly an ideal foundation for maintaining the safety of 
public spaces given that the efficiency of visual search is reduced with less detailed information 
(Biggs & Mitroff, 2014; Vickery, King, & Jiang, 2005).  
One difficulty with defining suspicious activity is that it can rarely be identified by a 
single criterion, and often no given behaviour is either necessary or sufficient to determine 
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malicious intent. The decision of whether or not to investigate a particular activity further is 
generally based upon multiple factors, including the context in which the behaviour is occurring. 
For example, looking around widely in a large, bright, shopping centre environment would seem 
quite natural, but may appear strange at an airport screening desk where people generally face 
forwards in a single file; however, looking around in itself would not necessarily be deemed 
suspicious unless other factors were also present, such as fixating on camera locations, 
attempting to conceal something, and looking nervous. One recent experimental paper found that 
crowd size and density were important cues in inferring level of threat, perhaps because 
participants take into account the perceived intention of suicide bombers to maximize the 
number of casualties (Brunyé et al., 2014). Other factors also had high predictive value of 
perceived threat including the proximity of entities to buildings, and whether or not individuals 
followed the common movement direction or showed erratic headings. Interestingly though, 
subjective reports showed that participants had little awareness of the parameters they were using 
to gauge threat level in the simulations viewed. This fits with the anecdotal idea that operators 
develop a “sixth sense” for behaviours or combinations of behaviours that seem out of place in a 
particular context, but are not necessarily able to articulate the parameters used (Keval & Sasse, 
2010). Tracking and eliciting such tacit knowledge – and so-called intuitive decision-making – 
have proven quite difficult (see Sauter, 1999) despite the availability of a range of knowledge 
elicitation techniques (Hoffman, 2008). One potential avenue is the use of policy capturing and 
process tracing techniques in order to extract the decision path that leads to investigating an 
event further (or not) (see Kim, Chung, & Paradice, 1997; Lafond et al., 2009; Lafond, Vallières, 
Vachon, & Tremblay, in press).   
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Where training courses are provided, guidelines may still not deliver a definitive 
checklist of rules that can be taught and learnt. The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) offers a general e-learning course for CCTV personnel and emphasizes the 
importance of knowing the specific environment in question and considering how particular 
behaviours may seem incongruent. Furthermore, operators are encouraged to take note of their 
“gut instinct”, even if they are unable to verbalize what makes them feel suspicious about a 
particular behaviour. This feeling of “just knowing” when a behaviour does not seem right is 
likely the product of many subtle factors, and also driven by a high level of SA. Interpreting the 
degree of threat presented by a particular individual or object often depends on a broader 
appreciation of the situation: For example, an awareness of how long a solitary bag has been 
unattended, and whether or not the owner is still in the vicinity (e.g., have they just moved away 
to check the departures board, or left the station completely?). It is likely that this gut instinct 
does develop with experience, with the suggestion that experts are better able to anticipate 
upcoming visual events. Experienced CCTV operators have been found to process scenes more 
efficiently than untrained observers (Howard, Troscianko, Gilchrist, Behera, & Hogg, 2013), 
with less eye movement variability and a greater ability than non-experts to move their eyes to 
goal-relevant areas of the scene (i.e., “knowing what to look for”, a finding that has also been 
applied to sport; Howard, Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2010; Vickers, 2009). When ambiguous but 
potentially suspicious events occurred (e.g., loitering in a car park/urban underpass/outside a 
nightclub), experts’ attention tended to be more drawn to “suspiciousness”, with greater 
between-operator consistency in gaze location than with untrained individuals. 
A further issue highlighted in the qualitative studies reviewed was noise and 
concentration difficulties within the control room (Keval & Sasse, 2010). Security centre control 
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rooms are often shared with a number of security personnel meaning that continuous background 
sound from colleagues’ conversations, telephones ringing, and radio calls (e.g., police, ground 
security) can be distracting, as well as more explicit task interruptions that require the operator to 
temporarily suspend the ongoing task so as to engage in another activity. Although background 
sound itself does not require any explicit response on the part of the operator, it can be disruptive 
by capturing attention: Auditory distraction paradigms show that when we perceive a loud, new 
or incongruent sound, attention necessarily orients towards that sound, momentarily diverting 
resources away from the task in hand (e.g., Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2007). Fragmented 
conversation that has frequent onsets and offsets (e.g., hearing just one side of a colleague’s 
telephone conversation, interspersed with quiet), is known to be particularly disruptive (e.g., 
Emberson, Lupyan, Goldstein, & Spivey, 2010) since attention is particularly captured by the 
onset of sound (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007). Higher levels of concentration (i.e. the degree of 
attentional engagement) are known to reduce distraction from irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Halin, 
Marsh, Hellman, Hellström, & Sörqvist, 2014; Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, Vachon, & Jones, 
2013), and so auditory attentional capture may have less of an impact under conditions of high 
than low concentration (see Sörqvist & Marsh, 2015). On the other hand, operators are likely to 
be more susceptible to conditions of distraction under increased cognitive load (Lavie, 2005). 
There is evidence showing that individuals with higher working memory capacity may be more 
resistant to external distraction (e.g., Hughes et al., 2013; Sörqvist, 2010) as well as internal 
distraction (mind-wandering; e.g., Robinson & Unsworth, 2015), which is likely to be an issue 
for surveillance given the monotonous nature of the task.  
Another body of research demonstrates that even continuous background speech, without 
distinct onset/offsets, can be disruptive to a range of mental activities in the workplace, such as 
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reading, writing, mental arithmetic, and memory processes (see Banbury, Macken, Tremblay, & 
Jones, 2001). Although we may think that we can simply “block out” background sound after a 
while, research shows that it is not something we are able to habituate to over time (Tremblay & 
Jones, 1998), and disruption occurs despite efforts to ignore the sound, and regardless of its 
volume (Ellermeier & Hellbruck, 1998). Furthermore, it is not just verbal tasks that are 
vulnerable to interference from background speech but visuo-spatial processes too (Jones, 
Farrand, Stuart, & Morris, 1995). One view is that interference arises due to a conflict of process 
between the background sound and the focal task, for example, a conflict between the automatic 
perceptual organization of speech sounds, and any “seriation” (memory for the order of events) 
required by the focal task (see Hughes, 2014). In the case of surveillance, acoustic changes 
present in the background speech may interfere with an operator’s ability to process and commit 
to memory the order of a series of actions observed on the screen or between screens. In turn, the 
inability to retain information about the actions and movements of various individuals could 
impact upon SA and the operator’s interpretation of the situation. 
 Alternatively, a conflict of process may occur beyond perceptual features to a conflict at 
the semantic level. Although operators will attempt to block out background sound, the meaning 
of speech may still be registered relatively automatically and this can conflict with semantic 
properties of information that he/she is making a conscious effort to retain. This could 
particularly be the case if the background sound contains information that is similar (but 
irrelevant to) the operator’s current task (Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2009; Marsh, Perham, 
Sörqvist, & Jones, 2014). For example, even if not attending to a colleague’s conversation, 
semantic information regarding an individual’s appearance may nevertheless be processed and 
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then inadvertently conflict with information held in working memory regarding the operator’s 
current search task, potentially increasing false alarms and suspect identification errors.  
Aside from background sound, monitoring effectiveness may be affected by more explicit 
distraction in the form of task interruptions, such as requests for information from an external 
authority (e.g., Hodgetts, Vachon, & Tremblay, 2014), or from dynamic team communication 
within the control room itself (e.g., Tremblay, Vachon, Lafond, & Kramer, 2012). Just a 20-s 
phone call for example, will take participants’ attention away from the screens while events 
continue to unfold, which then requires time to reconfigure and update a mental model of 
people/activities that have continued to evolve. Interruptions can thus impede task flow and 
reduce SA (Endsley, 1995; see St. John & Smallman, 2008). In a dynamic military surveillance 
task, eye fixations were found to be quicker following interruption (Hodgetts et al., 2014), 
supporting the idea of a rapid re-encoding and updating of the situation upon return. In this task, 
interruptions were found to slow decision-making time during the post interruption period, and 
this cost persisted for longer under conditions of divided attention or higher workload (Hodgetts, 
Tremblay, Vallières, & Vachon, 2015). The process of recovering SA after very brief 
interruptions is thought to involve the automatic reactivation of task goals (Altmann & Trafton, 
2002), while a more effortful process of reconstruction will be necessary if attention has been 
diverted for a longer period (Salvucci, 2010). If a critical change occurs during the interruption it 
can be difficult for the visual system to capture and compare pre- and post-interruption visual 
transients, thus exacerbating the problem of change detection (St. John & Smallman, 2008).  
Although interruptions are generally found to have a negative impact on performance, an 
interesting possibility is that interruption may actually improve incident detection in longer 
scenarios by heightening arousal and reducing the vigilance decrement (Ariga & Lleras, 2011). 
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The suggestion here is that a vigilance decrement occurs not because of depletion in attentional 
resources, but due to a difficulty in maintaining the activation of the vigilance goal which then 
habituates over time (c.f. Hopstaken, van der Linden, Bakker, Kompier, & Leung, 2016). In this 
case, interruption may serve a useful purpose in terms of momentarily deactivating the goal so 
that it does not habituate, and thus vigilance performance may be maintained for longer.  
Another important issue highlighted by observational studies and interviews is the length 
of shifts and unsociable hours that operators are subjected to, making fatigue and boredom a key 
concern. A typical shift pattern can involve four consecutive 12-hour day shifts, a two-day break, 
and four consecutive 12-hour night shifts (Keval & Sasse, 2010). Due to circadian rhythms, 
performance on a range of tasks is known to be impaired during night time hours as our internal 
biological clock is willing us to sleep. There is a trough of efficiency between 01:00 to 07:00, 
and the onset of fatigue occurs sooner if the period of work begins in the trough, or at the onset 
of the trough (Rosa, Colligan, & Lewis, 1989). If sleep is not adequately caught up upon, then 
frequently working unsociable hours may also result in sleep deprivation which can affect visual 
perception (Quant, 1992), reaction time and sustained attention (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982), 
and short- and long-term memory (Polzella, 1975; Idzikowski, 1984).  
 Proactive security surveillance requires active visual search throughout these long shifts; 
however, vigilance is largely motivational and can be hard to sustain when incidents seldom 
occur. For example, in Smith’s (2004) study, despite 24-hour monitoring not a single incident 
was detected on any of the 11 cameras in three weeks (Smith, 2004). Surveillance personnel 
report the need to take frequent breaks to prevent them from “going wappy” (Gill et al., 2005), 
while newspapers, crosswords, and other distractions are used in CCTV control rooms as a way 
to cope with the monotony of the job (Smith, 2004). In visual search, there is accumulating 
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evidence that the probability of detecting a target is influenced by the prevalence of target 
presentation. Recent studies have shown that high-prevalence targets are detected more often 
than low-prevalence targets (the so-called prevalence effect; Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Wolfe, 
Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005). The increased probability of detecting a high-prevalence target has 
also been demonstrated in more realistic environments such as airport X-ray screening (e.g., 
Godwin, Menneer, Cave & Donnelly, 2010; Godwin, Menneer, Cave, Helman et al., 2010) and 
has been found to influence detection performance by increasing the time spent examining 
objects in the display (Godwin, Menneer, Cave, Thaibsyah, & Donnelly, 2015). The low 
prevalence of incidents in CCTV security surveillance may therefore impair detection 
performance. When attention must be sustained for long periods of time, and when the 
occurrence of critical events are rare, a “vigilance decrement” can occur (Parasuraman, Warm, & 
See, 1998; Stearman & Durso, 2016); that is, the likelihood that a critical event will be noticed, 
or the speed with which it is detected, is reduced. One misperception is that the vigilance 
decrement occurs only after hours of observation; while it may be increased over longer periods 
(e.g., Meuter & Renata, 2016), a reduction in performance has been demonstrated with tasks as 
short as 10 or 12 min (Temple et al., 2000). Furthermore, although vigilance tasks are typically 
associated with low-workload and understimulating assignments, the need to maintain alertness 
over prolonged periods is also required in high-demand sustained attention tasks, and so 
surveillance of dynamic and complex situations may also be vulnerable to a vigilance decrement. 
One suggestion is that fatigue from focused attention reduces sensitivity to events so that they 
are less likely detected (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Another viewpoint is that reduced vigilance 
performance does not arise from a reduction in mental capacity or energy over time, but an 
active disengagement from the task so as to save costly cognitive resources for more beneficial 
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activities at a later point. That is, during mental fatigue, people do not become less able to 
perform the task but just less inclined to do so (Hopstaken et al., 2016). 
Given the long shifts and number of camera feeds to monitor, it is perhaps not surprising 
that some incidents are missed especially if on screen for only a brief amount of time; however, 
it is curious that seemingly prominent objects or events can also remain undetected for a 
prolonged period. Fathers 4 Justice campaigners for example, despite wearing conspicuous 
superhero costumes, have managed to evade security surveillance to achieve several high-profile 
stunts at key London landmarks (e.g., Buckingham Palace, House of Commons, Tower Bridge). 
This phenomenon is known as inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, Scholl, 
Clifford, & Simons, 2005) and poses a problem for security surveillance due to the cognitive 
challenges associated with the task of a CCTV operator (e.g., cognitive/perceptual overload, 
dynamic evolving environment). Research into inattentional blindness demonstrates that the 
phenomenon is more likely to occur when attentional demands of the task are high (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999) and when the expectancy of events is low (Steelman, McCarley & Wickens, 
2013). Moreover, failures to notice obvious objects or events become more likely as screen 
quantity increases (Finnegan, 2011). These are conditions characteristic of CCTV surveillance, 
whereby operators must monitor for multiple threats on multiple screens (high attentional 
demands), yet the occurrence of actual incidents are few and far between (low expectancy). On 
the other hand, surveillance during times of civil unrest may give rise to a high number of 
incidents, but still the vulnerability to detection failure remains. Studies show that inattentional 
blindness can be exacerbated during periods of high tempo activity when there are competing 
visual demands (Nikolic & Sarter, 2001; Sarter & Woods, 1994), and when visuo-spatial 
information must be maintained in memory (Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005), as might be the 
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case when keeping track of the evolution of several potential incidents across multiple camera 
feeds. Inattentional blindness has been found to increase with greater working memory load 
(Fougnie & Marois, 2007), with some evidence to suggest that individuals with higher working 
memory capacity might be less vulnerable (Hannon & Richards, 2010), although this may only 
be the case at high loads (Calvillo & Jackson, 2014). 
Research Agenda 
Interviews and observational studies have identified key problems in CCTV operations 
that could be better understood – and hopefully to some extent alleviated – through further 
investigation using psychological theory as a framework to guide predictions and interpretation. 
Applying an experimental approach, the research we propose will use the Cognitive Solutions for 
Surveillance in Security (CSSS) microworld; a dynamic and realistic monitoring task that 
simulates CCTV operations within a city centre setting (see Vachon, Vallières, Suss, Thériault, 
& Tremblay, 2016). While previous experimental research into surveillance has tended to rely 
upon existing unscripted CCTV footage (Dadashi et al., 2013) or scripted actions carried out by 
actors in public places (van Voorthuijsen et al., 2005), the use of a microworld can circumvent 
many of the issues that these approaches entail. There are limitations to the types of activities 
that can be staged (or limitations to the existing footage available), but a microworld allows 
inclusion of events such as explosions/fires that might otherwise be unethical or expensive to 
stage. Another issue is extraneous variables and experimental control: Use of a microworld 
allows precise control over scripting such as the location, timing, duration, frequency and nature 
of incidents, so that direct comparisons can be made between experimentally manipulated 
conditions. 
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 The CSSS microworld provides a complex and realistic simulation of operations in a 
CCTV control room. The participant monitors a large video display wall comprising six camera 
feeds; they must switch regularly between available camera viewpoints, keep abreast of 
intelligence updates, and communicate with external colleagues (e.g., police, store security). The 
types of events scripted might be location-specific and relate to a pre-task briefing (e.g., look out 
for intrusions into the Parliament building), or person-specific whereby the participant must look 
for a suspect fitting a particular description. Other unanticipated events might also occur (e.g., 
street fight, graffiti) for which participants must also be alert. In addition to investigating 
detection rates and times, eye-tracking measures can be taken to understand the deployment of 
attention across displays. 
In setting out a research agenda, we turn to a recent model of attention to gain insight into 
why certain features of the control room environment might exacerbate the challenges of 
proactive security surveillance and the detection of critical events. NSEEV (noticing – salience, 
expectancy, effort, value; Steelman, McCarley, & Wickens, 2011) is a recent model of attention 
behaviour, and although not directly applied to surveillance issues, it could provide a useful 
theoretical basis for understanding the challenges faced in detection and monitoring tasks. It 
combines aspects of basic visual perception such as visual search and attentional capture, with a 
broader engineering approach that also takes into account the working environment. The model 
can be used to estimate detection rates and response times to dynamic events using heuristic 
parameter values, and has been validated against empirical data on the detection of visual alerts 
(Steelman et al., 2011; Wickens, Hooey, Gore, Sebok, & Koenicke, 2009). 
The model predicts that on account of bottom-up attentional features, the greater the 
salience of an incident, the greater the likelihood of detection and the faster the response time. 
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Experimental studies show that dynamic visual search in evolving realistic scenes is more 
effortful with increasing visual clutter (Neider, Brotzen, & Zelinsky, 2010), and so large crowds 
or cluttered displays can reduce the efficiency with which incidents are located (e.g., Boot, 
Kramer, Becic, Wiegmann, & Kubose, 2006). Higher rates of detection have been found when 
the target/incident is visually salient and when present on screen for a longer period; while 
detection is reduced when the scene is complex, dynamic, and in need of deeper visual analysis 
(Donald, Donald, & Thatcher, 2015). One way to compare saliency could be the size of the 
incident on the screen; for example, a street fight involving a large group of people would 
perhaps be more salient (and thus more likely detected) than an incident involving a solitary 
individual. When perceptual load is increased, the NSEEV model would predict that with more 
visual clutter, each individual or event would have reduced salience, particularly if there are 
similar distractors. Generally, the perpetrators of crime try to conceal their illegal activity and 
thus minimize saliency; as such, it may be difficult to notice the covert actions of a shoplifter 
who integrates amongst other regular shoppers. On the other hand, an event such as a large 
explosion would presumably be more salient due to, for example, its sudden onset (which may 
help capture attention even in the periphery; see Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; 
Theeuwes, 1994), the social attention of others (e.g., reaction of bystanders; see Langton & 
Bruce, 1999), and its impact on other activity in the vicinity (e.g., damage to property) increasing 
the size of the area affected on screen.  
According to the model, top-down attentional settings can also influence the speed and 
likelihood of detection; in particular, an event that is perceived as being more likely to occur 
should have a greater level of attentional activation and thus be more likely fixated (and 
consequently detected) than one that is not anticipated (expectancy). Following a sports event for 
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example, surveillance personnel might be on particular alert for fighting between rival fans, but 
due to this bias in the allocation of focused attentional resources, they might be relatively less 
sensitive to other types of incident (e.g., pickpocketing, fire). Thus if both occurred, the fight 
might be more likely detected due to greater expectancy and attentional activation. We intend to 
test the effect of expectancy on detection through our manipulation of incident type: 1) looking 
for a specific incident on a specific screen (e.g., trespassing in a forbidden area), 2) a specific 
incident on a non-specific screen (e.g., looking for a missing child), and 3) a non-specific 
incident in a non-specific location (other illegal activity for which the participant has not been 
forewarned). One might find that detection rates are higher for those incidents for which the 
participant is specifically forewarned through pre-task briefing, rather than for those incidents 
that are not anticipated. The expectancy component of the model can also help to explain why it 
is difficult to maintain vigilance over long periods when incidents are few and far between; as 
time goes by without any incidents, expectancy of a future event declines and makes detection 
less likely if it does occur.  
Another factor to be tested is the impact of effort needed to shift attention towards the 
event. One might expect that an incident occurring closer to the current point of gaze would be 
more likely – and more quickly – detected than one occurring in the periphery. Thus an increase 
in cognitive load (i.e., a greater number of screens to monitor) would likely mean a greater 
chance of missing a relevant event (especially if brief in duration) by virtue of not looking in the 
right place at the right time, and by requiring greater effort to switch attention towards a different 
screen. Finally, the model emphasizes the influence of incident value; the 
criticality/consequences of that event being missed should it occur. This would be tested by 
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comparing detection rates and times between those incidents rated as more severe (e.g., a car on 
fire; individual with a gun) with less critical incidents (e.g., graffiti; dropping litter; petty theft).  
As well as testing the basic parameters of the model within a security setting, we would 
also look to examine the impact of other control room stressors on operator performance, taking 
into account the NSEEV framework. In terms of background sound and interruptions, one might 
expect that attentional resources are diverted towards these environmental distractions leaving 
fewer resources to detect on-screen occurrences. Currently, the NSEEV model does not include 
any detection threshold; it is the case that all fixated items are detected, with the probability of 
fixating an item proportional to its relative level of attentional activation. It is possible that a 
detection threshold could be implemented into the model, such that any item with overall 
attentional activation above a certain level would be detected, irrespective of the source of that 
attentional activation. To reach thresholds for detection under conditions of distraction, incidents 
might need to be particularly important, visually salient, already anticipated, or occurring close 
to the focal point of gaze. 
Potential Solutions to Cognitive Limitations 
Automated systems. Given the critical importance to public safety of detecting potential 
threats—and the human vulnerability to detection failure—the development of intelligent 
surveillance systems to automate aspects of the detection task is perhaps not surprising. For 
example, police in London used facial recognition software to help identify those involved in the 
2011 riots (Dillow, 2011). Security organizations offer functions such as people/vehicle counters 
and object, intrusion and queue detector software (e.g., see www.kiwisecurity.com), while 
algorithms can be used to track movement and analyse behaviour (Valera & Velastin, 2005). 
Although there continue to be advances in CCTV technology, such systems will always require a 
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human operator at least in a supervisory capacity (Dadashi et al., 2013; Norris & Armstrong, 
1997), thus retaining some vulnerability to the cognitive limitations discussed previously. In such 
context, it would be remiss to spend excess time and resources perfecting the system itself, at the 
expense of understanding the interaction between the system and the human agent (Dadashi et 
al., 2013; Stedmon, King, & Wilson, 2007). Like any co-ordinated teamwork, a joint human-
automation system is most effective when participants are mutually predictable, responsive to 
each other’s influence, and are able to communicate their status and intentions in a way that is 
obvious and interpretable by the other(s) (Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 
2004). In essence, technology does not so much replace the human as change the nature of the 
work that the human does so that the two can work in harmony together towards a common goal. 
Automated systems do not necessarily provide a failsafe solution and in fact come with 
their own issues. An overreliance on automation (misuse) can create a “false sense of security” 
(Wickens, 1984), whereby operators become complacent and offload to the intelligent system in 
the belief that all incidents will be detected. However, an automated system can only alert the 
operator to the specific incidents that it has been programmed to detect, and there may be cases 
that are not picked up by the particular algorithm, or other unexpected threats that had not been 
anticipated. Furthermore, software may fail if conditions are sub-optimal, for example, if a 
suspect’s face is hidden from camera or if a potential threat is partially occluded. In these cases, 
there may need to be some judgement and flexibility on the part of the human operator. An 
overreliance on the software system and complacent attitude may lead to a decline in SA, 
meaning a reduced ability to gauge the presence of threat in evolving situations.  
On the other hand, neglect (disuse) of the system often occurs when there is a high false-
alarm rate. Automated software is more likely to “detect” a high number of possible threats for 
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filtering by the human operator, rather than risk missing an incident that could be catastrophic. 
However, this runs the risk of a “cry-wolf effect” whereby the operator deliberately chooses to 
ignore automated alerts believing that they too are most likely a false alarm (Breznitz, 1983; 
although see Wickens, Rice et al., 2009). Beyond the mere detection of problematic behaviour is 
also the need to distinguish benign behaviours from those that have a malicious or malevolent 
intention, and to determine what level of resources should be allocated. Even with the increase in 
automated systems, reliability and frequency of false alarms is still an issue, thus a lot of the 
responsibility for “detection” (filtering, prioritizing, and decision of response) is still placed 
firmly with the human operator. 
Automated systems developed within other supervisory and monitoring tasks 
demonstrate that even when critical events are detected automatically by the system, the human 
operator is still vulnerable to detection failures. Within the context of military operations, the 
Change History EXplicit (CHEX) tool (Smallman & St John, 2003) has been developed to 
circumvent the problem of change blindness by displaying a record of all changes occurring on 
the radar system. This table provides a cross reference or a “second chance” to detect changes 
that may have been missed if attention was directed elsewhere at the time of the event (e.g., 
during an interruption). However, one drawback of this system in its current form is that it 
records all changes, leaving the analysis and prioritization decisions to the human operator. 
Consequently, the table of recent changes can quickly become cluttered and such a high number 
of false alarms to filter through may even detrimentally increase workload relative to no support 
tool (Vallières, Hodgetts, Vachon, & Tremblay, 2016). Thus, the introduction of an automated 
detection system does not eliminate error, and the fallibilities of the human cognitive system 
must be taken into account during the design process. 
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While, on the one hand, it may be desirable for automated systems to minimize the 
number of false alarms generated, on the other hand, a certain number of false alarms may even 
improve detection performance. Within the context of baggage screening, one solution to the 
vigilance challenge has been Threat Image Projection (TIP) software. Essentially the reporting of 
threats decreases when there is a low probability, and so the idea is to increase the base rate 
through inserted graphic objects added to the images viewed. This maintains a higher level of 
vigilance (see Hopstaken et al., 2016) and increases reporting of items that are marginally 
suspect but which might have previously been dismissed on account of the low probability of 
risk. It is possible that a similar idea could be implemented within CCTV surveillance (e.g., 
inserting unattended baggage images) with the aim of increasing expectancy and thus shifting 
decision-making criterion to increase the likelihood of detection (Neil, Thomas, & Baker, 2007). 
However, the benefits of TIP software observed within a static detection task may not translate 
so well to a dynamically evolving surveillance environment.  
Attention Aware Systems. Such support systems take into account a user’s current focus 
and goals as well as environmental factors in order to update task information dynamically so 
that the most relevant information is displayed at the most appropriate time and in the most 
appropriate manner (e.g., Roda & Thomas, 2006). The aim is to avoid information overload and 
unnecessary mid-task distractions, while ensuring the timely receipt of the most pertinent 
information in a manner that is most easily processed. To do so, the system must detect the 
user’s current attentional state as well as alternative states, and establish the available attentional 
capacity of the user. Attentional focus can often be inferred through gaze tracking (although this 
is by no means a certain indicator; Rayner, 2009; Marshall, 2007; Simons & Rensink, 2005), 
while physiological measures have also been used (e.g., heart rate variability and 
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electroencephalogram [EEG] analysis; Chen & Vertegaal, 2004; see also Lieberman, Kramer, 
Montain, & Niro, 2007, for a wrist-worn system applied to monitor the level of vigilance in 
aviation). In some cases, the attention aware system may establish that the current goal has 
changed and adapt the nature of available information accordingly (e.g., content, depth, 
presentation), or it might establish that an alternative (better) focus is available and guide a goal 
change (interruption) within the current activity. Furthermore, the system may then later deliver 
reminders about previously unfinished tasks (e.g., providing context information necessary for 
resumption). The ability to monitor and adapt to the user’s current attentional state may be 
particularly useful for keeping operators on task and goal-focused during the long shifts that are 
characteristic of CCTV surveillance. Such a research and development endeavour – that is, to 
develop intelligent systems that adapt their intervention to the cognitive and affective functional 
state of its user – is long standing and requires measurements that capitalize on the online 
monitoring of multiple physiological sensors used as proxies to psychological dimensions (such 
as attention, stress, engagement and workload; see Durantin, Gagnon, Tremblay, & Dehais, 
2014), and conceptually valid metrics capable of providing diagnostic information about the 
variability in the functional state of the operator (Gagnon, Lafond, Rivest, Couderc, & Tremblay, 
2014). Promising results have identified physiological markers for attentional tunnelling (Dehais, 
Causse, & Tremblay, 2011) and the level of fun in video games (Chamberland, Grégoire, 
Michon, Gagnon, Jackson, & Tremblay, 2016), as well as methods to approximate mental 
models of decision makers (Lafond, Tremblay, & Banbury, 2013) that are the core of adaptive 
systems and individually-tailored cognitive assistants.    
Visualization. The manner in which information is displayed has the potential to either 
help or hinder the success with which the surveillance task is performed, however there is a 
Challenges of security surveillance 30 
 
dearth of studies looking into this aspect of surveillance. Typically, a single operator is 
responsible for a large number of screens displayed on a media wall. Often the number of CCTV 
cameras to be monitored exceeds the available screen space, meaning that operators need to 
switch between camera feeds at regular intervals rather than having all viewpoints available at 
any one time. One recent paper combining Cognitive System Engineering and User Experience 
Design considered how best to display all this available information and proposed three new 
designs to optimize the surveillance interface (Pelletier, Suss, Vachon, & Tremblay, 2015). 
Although there is perhaps an assumption that displaying all information at once is best (there 
then being the chance that attention could be captured in the periphery if something significant is 
happening), the authors suggest that this type of organization does not necessarily work in 
synchrony with the human’s natural mode of processing. They argue that visual processing 
occurs in a serial manner and propose a seemingly counterintuitive serial browsing design 
whereby operators flip sequentially through camera feeds, attending to each in turn. Other feeds 
are partially available in the background (similar to the iTunes cover flow design), but focal 
attention is concentrated on one scene at a time in a sequential rather than simultaneous manner. 
Other designs included a “carousel” with a main display and the opportunity to flip through 
others in the periphery, and a hybrid design that incorporated serial browsing of the main display 
with a multiplex display of other feeds available simultaneously. These designs could be 
considered more “cognitively ergonomic”, encouraging the operator to attend to one view at a 
time in a focused manner, rather than inefficiently attempting to divide attention between several 
at once. Improving the design and layout of control centre screens is a relatively neglected aspect 
of surveillance, yet careful design could offer a user experience that is more in harmony with 
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human perceptual affordances and cognitive limitations, thus improving visual search efficiency 
and detection rates.  
Training solutions. In the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks, the UK’s CPNI offered 
security advice and an e-learning course for CCTV operators. The course discusses human 
factors aspects of the job (e.g., memory, visual attention, personal biases), to make operators 
aware of their cognitive limitations and ways around them (e.g., noting down features of an 
incident so it is not forgotten, or asking colleagues open-ended questions about a situation so as 
not to influence others’ opinions with personal stereotypes). Inclusion of human factors aspects 
would seem to be good practice for training surveillance personnel in general (whether store 
security, control centre operators, cyber security), as optimal job performance extends beyond 
the mere technical know-how of operating equipment.  
As noted previously, experienced CCTV operators often report having a “sixth sense” for 
when an incident will occur; it would therefore be useful for training purposes to somehow 
capture the features that operators most frequently use in order to detect criminal activity. While 
it may be difficult for operators to verbalize the precise cues that they are picking up on (see, 
e.g., Cooke, 1999), as mentioned before, it might be possible to employ a policy capturing 
approach – a judgement analysis method using statistical models or machine learning algorithms 
to estimate expert judgements (e.g., Lafond et al., in press) – to help begin to understand a little 
more about the subjective decision criteria that are used for identifying suspicious activity in 
such cases. Eye-movement data could enable tracing the areas most recently fixated leading up 
to a decision, as well as those areas fixated most frequently and for the longest (see Rehder & 
Hoffman, 2005). From this it might be possible to infer which factors are most important in the 
assessment of suspicious activity, and specify the subjective heuristics that operators use (e.g., 
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target’s posture, direction of gaze, speed/direction of movement, interaction with others), and 
also whether these criteria shift under different conditions (e.g., load, distraction, boredom). The 
knowledge gleaned could greatly benefit the speed and success of both real-time and archival 
incident detection.  
Improved surveillance performance might also be achieved through the training of non-
technical skills; that is, general skills that are not specific to the equipment or procedures used 
within a particular work environment. Depending on the focus of the non-technical skill training, 
its content can be fed by knowledge elicitation methods such as Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA; 
see Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006) and Goal-Directed Task Analysis (GDTA; Endsley, 
Bolte, & Jones, 2003). CTA centers its analysis on addressing the knowledge structure and 
information processing strategies involved in task performance, and the underlying mental 
processes that give rise to errors, while GDTA focuses on situational awareness requirements 
associated with a task, and how that information must be used to support decision-making in 
dynamic environments. For instance, Adams et al. (2009) used these techniques to guide the 
development of support systems and training procedures for the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) in search and rescue missions. 
At the level of information processing capacity, one possibility regards improving the 
operator’s Useful Field of View (UFOV); that is, the size of the area around each fixation from 
which information can be extracted. UFOV narrows under stress and high cognitive workload 
(Ball, Beard, Roenker, Miller, & Griggs, 1988), which are key concerns for surveillance 
operators. However, the implication is that it can be trained; it tends to be wider in experienced 
drivers, and UFOV training improves the visual processing of older adults with benefits even at 
five-year follow-up (Willis et al., 2006). It seems plausible to suggest that such training could 
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benefit surveillance operators; by allowing more efficiency with each fixation, operators may be 
able to regain SA quicker whenever switching between screens or tasks.  
Summary 
Surveillance is necessary to detect and prevent the occurrence of dangerous incidents 
(e.g., drowning, aircraft collision) or deliberately malicious acts (terrorism, cyber-attacks, civil 
disobedience). In terms of the latter, governments have invested heavily in CCTV cameras with 
the intention to improve the safety and security of public spaces and infrastructure. At the same 
time, existing research on CCTV surveillance from a human factors perspective has tended to 
focus on technological and operational aspects (e.g., Pikaar et al., 2015). However, the very 
nature of CCTV control centres can leave operators vulnerable to cognitive failures during 
proactive security surveillance. Cognitive and perceptual overload is likely when information is 
displayed across numerous screens on a large media wall, with each displaying busy public 
places. This susceptibility is compounded by the dynamic nature of the task, the use of long 
shifts or unsociable hours, and visual/auditory distractions and interruptions. In the current paper 
we aim to stimulate research by pinpointing different human-related aspects of surveillance that 
deserve further investigation, and in turn greater knowledge may lead to recommendations for 
work policies or support systems. Although the development of automation represents 
advancement in the field, we must first understand the limitations and vulnerabilities of the 
cognitive system so that automated systems can work in harmony with the human operator.  
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